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ABSTRACT
Objective The tobacco industry spends large sums
lobbying the European Union (EU) institutions, yet
whether such lobbying signiﬁcantly affects tobacco policy
is not well understood. We used novel quantitative text
mining techniques to evaluate the impact of industry
pressure on the contested EU Tobacco Products Directive
revision.
Design Policy positions of 18 stakeholders including
the tobacco industry, health NGOs and tobacco retailers
were evaluated using their text submissions to EU
consultations and impact assessments. Using Wordscores
to calculate word frequencies, we developed a scale
ranging from 0–tobacco industry to 1–public health
organisations, which was then used to track changes in
the policy position of the European Commission’s 2010
consultation document, its 2012 ﬁnal proposal and the
European Parliament and Council’s approved legislation
in March 2014.
Results Several stakeholders’ positions were closer to
the tobacco industry than that of health NGOs, including
retailers (ω=0.35), trade unions (ω=0.34) and publishers
(ω=0.33 and ω=0.40). Over time the European
Commission’s position shifted towards the tobacco
industry from ω=0.52 (95% CI 0.50 to 0.54) to ω=0.40
(95% CI 0.39 to 0.42). This transition reﬂected an
increasing use of words pertaining to business and the
economy in the Commission’s document. Our ﬁndings
were robust to alternative methods of scoring policy
positions in EU documents.
Conclusions Using quantitative text mining
techniques, we observed that tobacco industry lobbying
activity at the EU was associated with signiﬁcant policy
shifts in the EU Tobacco Products Directive legislation
towards the tobacco industry’s submissions. In the light
of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control,
additional governance strategies are needed to prevent
undue inﬂuence of the tobacco industry on EU policy
making.
INTRODUCTION
Starting in 2009, the 2001 European Union (EU)
Tobacco Products Directive (TPD), regulating the
manufacture, marketing and sale of tobacco pro-
ducts, began a process of revision to reﬂect recent
scientiﬁc and market developments in the tobacco
sector. Ultimately the revision proposed to balance
a stricter regulation for tobacco manufacture,
market and sales, mainly for health reasons, with
the minimisation of economic costs of such regula-
tion. This led ultimately to agreement on a revised
directive—hereinafter referred to as the 2014 TPD
—which came into force in May 2014.1
From the outset, the process was mired in con-
troversy. The EU’s public consultation on the pro-
posed revision received an unprecedented number
(over 85 000) of submissions, many of which were
later found to be duplicates. In mid-2012, Swedish
Match accused the Health Commissioner, John
Dalli, of fraud, which eventually led to his resigna-
tion in October 2012.2 The next day, in a remark-
able twist, the Brussels headquarters of several
NGOs active in tobacco control were burgled and
documents and computers stolen.3
It is well-known that the tobacco industry
launched a massive campaign against the 2014
TPD, including targeting speciﬁc members of the
EU’s institutions, third party mobilisation and
ﬁnancing of studies to attempt to disprove the need
for revision.4 In particular, the tobacco industry has
been known for emphasising the economic costs of
increasing regulation, while downplaying health
beneﬁts.5 6 A 2012 analysis of leaked internal
Philip Morris documents found that its main lobby-
ing strategy was to ‘push’ (amend) or ‘delay’ the
TPD revision proposal,7 consistent with its
attempts to inﬂuence the original 2001 TPD.8
While its success in delaying the revision is evident
from the observation that the timeline slipped by
over a year,9 10 to our knowledge it is not known
whether industry pressure was able to push the leg-
islation’s position to favour the tobacco industry.
The tobacco industry asserts that public health
organisations such as the Smoke Free Partnership
actually skewed the EU policy in their favour,11
whereas these public health groups claim that
tobacco companies succeeded in undermining the
legislative process.12
To test these competing views, this paper evalu-
ates changes in the main drafts of the 2014 TPD
over time using automated content analysis to
determine how the policy position of the EU
changes with respect to the position of pressure
groups.
We ﬁrst quantify the textual changes that
occurred using Wordscores and assessed whether
they were more closely associated with the posi-
tions of public health organisations or the tobacco
industry.13 14 Wordscores has been widely applied
in political science to code policy positions for
party manifestos and lobbyist positions,15 16 includ-
ing European Commission documents.17 It scores
the policy positions in documents based on the fre-
quency of words. We drew on documents authored
by the tobacco industry and public health organisa-
tions as a basis for Wordscores to map the positions
of tobacco retailers and trade unions, who are
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known to have played a major role in the tobacco industry’s
mobilisation tactics,10 as well as other actors including associa-
tions representing publishers and advertisers which were likely
to have occupied more neutral positions. We then test the
hypothesis that tobacco industry pressure was able to shift the
TPD towards its position from DG-SANCO’s (Directorate
General for Health and Consumers) initial draft TPD revision
document.
DATA AND METHODS
Sources of data
To identify relevant stakeholders, we drew on the results of a
previous review of the TPD revision10 to select representatives
of the tobacco industry, health NGOs and other stakeholders,
including trade unions and publishing, advertising and retail
trade associations. We then performed Google searches for pub-
licly available documents in which they expressed their positions
in English. These included position papers, extended comments
on the Commission’s consultation paper and comments on the
impact assessment performed by RAND Europe (a non-proﬁt
institution providing research services). We extended our search
to include documents that were sent to the EU Commission by
stakeholders, and retrieved through a series of
Freedom-of-Information requests performed in 2013 and
2014.10 This yielded a total of 20 documents from 18 stake-
holders, written between 2010 and 2013.
Figure 1 summarises the timeline of the TPD process, and
table 1 lists the associated stakeholder documents used in the
analysis at each juncture. All texts are available on request. The
documents identifying the position of stakeholders were col-
lected at different stages of the process. The ﬁrst two came
during the Commission’s initial drafting of the proposal
between 2009 and 2012. RAND Europe consultants were con-
tracted by DG SANCO to undertake an initial assessment of the
impacts of revising the TPD, and consultations from relevant
stakeholders were invited by the commission (time points A and
B in ﬁgure 1). DG-SANCO also held a public consultation, per-
mitting industry to submit its positions alongside those of other
stakeholders (time point C). More stakeholder submissions were
made when the TPD process reached the European Parliament
and Council of Ministers in 2013 (time point D).
These documents include three iterations of the 2014 EU
TPD revision used to assess the EU position: the consultation
document of September 2010, the ﬁnal Commission proposal
of December 2012, and the ﬁnal document approved by the
European Parliament and the Council in March 2014. These
texts were taken from the European Commission and the
European Parliament websites.18 19
Measuring policy positions
To compare policy positions taken by stakeholders with the
content of the evolving EU legislation we used the scaling algo-
rithm Wordscores.13 14 Wordscores infers policy positions, or
scores, for new documents—‘virgin texts’—on the basis of
documents with known scores, ‘reference texts’. It uses the fre-
quency of words in each document, relative to the total number
of words in a text, based on the assumption that agents with dif-
ferent policy positions use different wording which reﬂects their
ideology or stance. For example, the tobacco industry more fre-
quently invokes arguments about the economy and business
than public health actors.5 When an unknown text includes
more text about the economy and business, it is more likely to
reﬂect a tobacco friendly position than one from a health actor.
The relative frequency of a given word w contained in a
given reference text r, Fwr, is used to compute the conditional
probability that we are reading text r given that we are reading
word w. This probability is then used to construct a score, Sw,
for each word w as a weighted average of all the scores of refer-
ence texts where word w shows up, weighted by the calculated
conditional probability. In a second stage, the calculated word
scores are used to compute an overall document score for each
virgin text v, ωv, as the sum of the scores of words contained in
it weighted by their relative frequency Fwv:
vv ¼
X
w
ðFwv  SwÞ ð1Þ
This approach has been previously validated for political texts
and economy policy speeches,15 16 and has also been applied to
European Commission documents.17
In the ﬁrst step of the analysis, we transferred EU documents
from pdf to text20 and then manually removed superﬂuous
information, including all interest group names and their
descriptions, headers and footers, contact details and citations
from Commission documents. We created a frequency matrix
using the program JFreq in R21 which further reduced words to
their roots and removed stop words, numbers and symbols and
estimated the frequency distribution of words across documents.
In the second part of the analysis, we introduced the scores
for the reference texts, which formed a basis for classifying the
virgin texts. In view of the known polarisation between the
tobacco industry and public health actors, we coded all 8
tobacco industry texts as 0 and the 5 health NGO texts as
1. Text on e-cigarettes was excluded because of the heterogen-
eity in policy positions held by public health organisations.
These reference texts were then used to quantify scores for
documents representing the positions of ‘other stakeholders’,
including some identiﬁed as having been mobilised by and
having close associations with tobacco companies, such as
tobacco retailers and trade unions10 12 22 and others which may
have been more neutral, such as organisations representing
advertisers and publishers.
In the ﬁnal step we tracked changes in the EU policies by
comparing word scores of the initial EU Commission consult-
ation paper dated 1 September 2010 through to the ﬁnal pro-
posal dated 19 December 2012. We then analysed the ﬁnal
legislation, voted on by the Parliament in plenary in February
2014 and subsequently approved by the Council on the 14
March 2014.
Rescaling wordscores
One limitation of Wordscores is that the estimated word scores of
virgin texts are not directly comparable to reference texts. Since
Figure 1 European Union (EU) Tobacco Products Directive Timeline.
Documents used to measure the EU’s position boxed. Timing of
documents used in analysis and set out in table 1 is shown in dotted
lines.
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reference texts tend to have overlapping, non-discriminating
words, their word scores tend to be pulled towards the middle of
the scale.23 To adjust for this limitation, we rescaled the word-
scores using the Martin-Vanberg (MV) transformation, developed
to facilitate comparability.24 We estimated positions for the refer-
ence texts along with the virgin texts, and use the most extreme
positions observed among the calculated word scores to rescale
scores for each virgin text as follows:
ðvv  v1Þ=ðv1  v2Þ ð2Þ
where ωv again stands for the raw score of each virgin text and
ω1 and ω2 for the estimated scores of those virgin texts with the
most extreme values. Thus we present both raw and MV trans-
formed word scores, with 95% CIs. All word scores were calcu-
lated using STATAV.13.0.
RESULTS
Frequencies of word use by different actors
Table 2 shows the word frequency matrix for the most 15
common words used in each document that was part of the ana-
lysis. Frequencies are presented as a percentage of the total
number of words in each document. The ﬁrst three texts are the
ofﬁcial EU documents and the rest are divided into one of three
categories, health NGOs, tobacco industries and other stake-
holders. The matrix shows that the frequency of ‘health’ in the
health NGO documents, which was a greater concern on the part
of NGOs, was about 1.71% of words, corresponding to twice
the frequency of health language in tobacco documents, of
0.87%. Over time the word root ‘health’ decreased from 1.50%
of total words per document in the initial Commission proposal
to 1.21% of total words in the ﬁnal approved legislation.
Similarly, the word root ‘warn’ was twice as frequent among
health NGO documents, 1.68%, compared with tobacco
industry ones, of 0.69% and declined from 1.57% to 1.18% in
ofﬁcial EU documents. The opposite pattern occurred for ﬁnance
language, such as the root ‘econom’, which albeit not among the
15 most common word roots was the focus of arguments by the
tobacco industry.10 The average frequency of this word in health
documents was 0.05%, while it was 0.14% in the tobacco indus-
try documents. It gradually increased in the EU documents from
zero instances in the consultation document to 0.20% in the
Commission proposal to 0.25% in the ﬁnal document, reﬂecting
a greater use of such language than tobacco companies.
Estimating policy positions of differing actors
Based on tobacco industry and public health documents, we
next estimated policy positions using Wordscores. Table 3 pre-
sents the estimated raw score for each text, its SD, the MV score
and associated 95% CIs, as well as the numbers of total and
unique scored words.
As shown in the table 3, the estimated position of groups of
other stakeholders is closer to that of the tobacco industry,
albeit more moderate. It estimated positions for the European
Magazine Media Association of ω=0.33 (95% CI 0.29 to 0.38)
and for retailers of ω=0.35 (95% CI 0.33 to 0.36). The
European Communities Trade Mark Association was scored at
ω=0.35 (95% CI 0.32 to 0.39), and the German Magazine
Publishers corresponded to ω=0.40 (95% CI 0.37 to 0.43),
relatively closer to public health.
Estimating textual change in EU documents over time
Finally, we compared how EU legislation evolved throughout
the process, relative to the position of the tobacco industry and
public health actors.
Figure 2 plots the MV scores and the 95% CIs for each of the
three EU documents. Consistent with the observation of
Table 1 Description of documents used
Entity Abbreviation Side Approximate date Description and source
Association of European Cancer Leagues and Smoke Free Partnership ECL/SFP H 6 June 2012 C Position paper, online
European Federation of Allergy and Airways Diseases Patients’ Associations EFA H 1 July 2013 D Position paper, online
European Public Health Alliance EPHA1 H 31 December 2010 C Opinion on Public Consultation, online
European Public Health Alliance EPHA2 H 1 May 2013 D Position paper, online
European Society of Cardiology ESC H 1 March 2013 D Position paper, online
Confederation of European Community Cigarette Manufacturers CECCM T 4 March 2010 A Comment on RAND, FOI
European Cigar Manufacturers Association ECMA T 14 December 2010 C Opinion on Public Consultation, FOI
European Smoking Tobacco Association ESTA T 1 March 2010 A Comment on RAND, FOI
Imperial Tobacco IT T 21 February 2013 D Position paper, online
Japan Tobacco International JTI T 16 December 2010 C Opinion on Public Consultation, FOI
Philip Morris Limited PML T 28 February 2013 D Opinion to UK Health Department, online
Philip Morris International PMI1 T 15 December 2010 C Opinion on Public Consultation, online
Philip Morris International PMI2 T 20 October 2010 B Comment on RAND, online
Association of German Magazine Publishers GM S 1 December 2012 C Position paper, FOI
Association of Communication Companies, representing the interests
of the advertising agencies in Belgium
ACC S 8 December 2010 C Opinion on Public Consultation, FOI
European Communities Trade Mark Association ECTA S 15 December 2010 C Position paper, online
European Magazine Media Association EMMA S 6 December 2012 C Position paper, FOI
European Trade Union Confederation (workers) EFFAT S 1 December 2010 B Comment on RAND, FOI
Joint statement between several trade mark associations TrMark S 3 July 2013 D Position paper, online
Retailer Working Group RWG S 22 April 2011 C Position paper, FOI
European Commission Consultation 1 March 2010 Consultation, online
European Commission Commission 19 December 2012 Proposal, online
Commission, EU Parliament, Council Final 14 March 2014 Legislation, online
Health NGO’s (H), Tobacco Industry (T) and Other Stakeholders (S).
EU, European Union; FOI, freedom of information request.
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Table 2 Word frequency matrix, in percentages
Tobacco Product Smoke Health State Consum Warn Member Market Packag Cigarett Commiss Impact Direct European Union
Consultation 5.17 4.79 1.05 1.50 3.07 1.12 1.57 3.00 1.57 1.42 1.27 0.15 0.15 1.35 0.52
Commission 3.78 4.05 0.57 1.29 2.39 0.75 1.24 2.37 0.98 0.82 0.75 1.24 0.04 1.51 0.15
Final 4.04 4.19 0.67 1.21 2.25 0.58 1.18 2.25 0.95 0.90 0.75 1.01 0.03 1.40 0.10
Health
ESC 0.27 0.33 0.30 0.19 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.11
EPHA1 3.89 2.88 0.62 2.02 1.63 0.86 2.41 1.09 1.63 1.32 1.09 0.39 0.23 0.70 0.54
EPHA2 4.89 4.49 0.80 1.68 1.04 0.40 1.20 1.12 0.96 1.28 0.64 0.56 0.32 0.72 1.28
ECL/SFP 4.36 3.17 1.09 2.38 0.99 0.30 2.87 0.79 0.69 0.99 1.68 0.10 0.20 0.79 0.20
EFA 2.57 1.97 2.72 2.27 0.15 0.30 1.82 0.15 0.00 1.66 0.61 0.15 0.30 0.30 0.30
Average 3.20 2.57 1.11 1.71 0.78 0.39 1.68 0.64 0.66 1.06 0.81 0.25 0.23 0.51 0.49
Tobacco
PML 1.11 2.02 0.96 0.98 1.04 0.34 0.41 0.85 1.40 0.39 1.53 2.54 1.32 0.47 1.50
PMI1 2.65 1.72 2.08 0.72 1.04 0.48 0.40 0.68 0.72 0.72 1.72 0.40 0.36 0.44 0.80
PMI2 1.65 0.69 1.25 1.19 0.65 0.37 0.69 0.39 0.96 0.73 0.87 0.47 2.00 0.19 1.03
ECMA 2.33 2.74 0.82 1.22 1.17 1.40 1.69 1.22 0.82 1.40 0.12 0.47 0.06 0.06 0.29
CECCM 1.80 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.36 0.00 0.54 0.90 0.00 0.00 1.26 3.77 1.26 0.00
IT 1.69 2.51 0.56 1.01 1.13 1.01 0.98 1.13 0.90 0.30 0.75 2.14 0.26 0.83 1.24
JTI 0.42 0.44 3.50 1.12 0.28 2.39 0.87 0.09 0.31 0.55 0.86 0.19 0.45 0.13 0.06
ESTA 6.67 4.17 0.92 0.75 0.79 0.79 0.48 0.61 1.01 0.61 0.75 0.22 0.83 1.05 0.83
Average 2.29 1.83 1.26 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.69 0.69 0.88 0.59 0.83 0.96 1.13 0.55 0.72
Other stakeholders
EFFAT 4.53 1.46 1.05 0.57 0.00 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.57 0.32 0.81 0.32 0.97 0.32 1.78
ECTA 2.57 2.76 0.00 0.37 0.18 1.10 0.18 0.00 0.18 2.21 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.37 0.92
RWG 2.85 2.39 0.97 0.66 0.56 0.71 0.10 0.41 1.37 0.76 0.66 0.41 0.25 0.15 1.32
EMMA 2.72 2.72 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.63 0.21 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.21 0.42 1.26 0.63
ACC 2.12 6.35 0.00 0.18 1.06 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.59 3.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.71
TrMark 0.19 1.32 0.00 1.13 0.00 1.32 0.94 1.13 0.38 1.70 0.00 0.38 0.19 0.19 0.38
GM 2.74 5.16 0.32 2.26 0.16 1.45 2.10 0.16 1.13 3.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.00
Average 2.53 3.17 0.33 0.74 0.37 0.82 0.53 0.30 0.75 1.77 0.27 0.21 0.29 0.50 0.82
Frequency matrix created with JFreq; proportion of frequency of each word on total of words calculated manually. Columns organised from most frequently occurring word roots on the left to less frequent on the right, calculated on the totality of the
document set.
ECL/SFP, Association of European Cancer Leagues and Smoke Free Partnership; EFA, European Federation of Allergy and Airways Diseases Patients’ Associations; EPHA1, European Public Health Alliance 1; EPHA 2, European Public Health Alliance 2; ESTA,
European Smoking PMI, Philip Morris International; PMI1, Philip Morris International 1; PMI2, Philip Morris International 2; ECMA, European Cigar Manufacturers Association; CECCM, Confederation of European Community Cigarette Manufacturers; IT,
Imperial Tobacco; JTI, Japan Tobacco Internal; EFFAT, European Trade Union Confederation (workers); RWG, Retailer Working Group; EMMA, European Magazine Media Association; ACC, Association of Communication Companies TrMark, Joint statement
between several trade mark associations; GM, Association of German Magazine Publishers.
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increasing language about the economy and choice, we observed
that the EU’s policy position moved towards that of the tobacco
industry and mobilised groups, ﬁrst during the Commission
stage from an initial word score of 0.52 (95% CI 0.50 to 0.54)
to 0.45 (95% CI 0.43 to 0.48). It further shifted towards the
estimated position of the tobacco industry when it reached the
EU Parliament and Council, yielding a ﬁnal word score of 0.40
(95% CI 0.39 to 0.42), which was signiﬁcantly different from
the initial position.
Robustness tests
To test the robustness of our results to initial classiﬁcation
assumptions, we re-estimated word scores using a different
classiﬁcation method for the texts. We ﬁrst used as reference
texts only the four documents from Philip Morris
International and the European Public Health Alliance, to
classify the policy positions of the other stakeholders in the
tobacco industry and the health NGOs. We then used the esti-
mated positions as reference texts to classify the positions of
the other stakeholder groups and the EU documents, as in the
initial analysis. As shown in Web appendix 1, none of the
results was signiﬁcantly altered, although the position of
mobilised groups began to overlap with that of the tobacco
industry for some actors. We further tested alternative
methods for rescaling the estimated raw Wordscores, includ-
ing other commonly used scaling transformations.13 None of
the results changed qualitatively.
CONCLUSION
The revision of the TPD generated a large amount of interest
by stakeholders. The tobacco industry, in particular, developed
a comprehensive strategy aimed at undermining and delaying
the process.10 Using quantitative text analysis methods we
document that the EU legislation shifted signiﬁcantly towards
the tobacco industry’s position and that several other stake-
holders, including retailers, were associated with the industry’s
position.
Our application of automated content analysis has several
important assumptions and associated limitations. First, com-
pared with traditional hand-coding methods, automated
content analysis provides an objective quantiﬁcation of policy
positions. However, this depends crucially on an assumption
that each actor’s ideology is expressed through word choice.
It is well-established that tobacco industry argumentation
often stresses the economic impacts of policies,5 which can
manifest in its documents’ language. Consistent with possibil-
ity, our analysis found that the word root ‘econom’ appeared
twice as frequently in tobacco documents as in health NGO
documents, whereas health language appeared more fre-
quently in the latter. Further the observation that the fre-
quency of the words ‘health’ and ‘warn’ diminishes, while
economic terms increase over time, corroborates our observa-
tion of a shift towards the industry’s position. Second, quanti-
fying word scores relies on estimating probabilities that are
more reliably calculated when reference texts contain large
numbers of words that are shared with the documents with
unknown positions. We were able to overcome this limitation
by using lengthy stakeholder texts from multiple stages of the
process. It is also necessary for reference texts to differ from
each other, so we included documents from stakeholders
known to be diametrically opposed on the TPD. Third, given
the complexity of the positions involving e-cigarettes, we
excluded submissions relating to them in this analysis. Future
research could apply the approach developed in this paper to
evaluate the positions of various e-cigarette advocates in rela-
tion to public health and tobacco actors. Finally, it is not pos-
sible to interpret the raw word scores, but only their relative
positions, as the reference texts were used to develop a novel
scale ranging from the policy positions of health organisations
to those of the tobacco industry. Scores of virgin texts tend to
be less extreme than the reference texts, because the virgin
texts include more non-discriminating words, which can lead
to clustering in the centre of the scale. To facilitate compar-
ability across virgin and reference texts, we followed previous
Table 3 Policy position estimations
Texts
Number of
unique words
Total words
scored
Raw word
score (SE)
MV transformed
word score
95% CI (MV)
Lower bound Upper bound
Consultation 689 2592 0.40 (0.004) 0.520 0.50 0.54
Commission 1314 11 181 0.38 (0.002) 0.445 0.43 0.46
Final 1235 12 115 0.36 (0.002) 0.404 0.39 0.42
European Magazine Media Association 309 840 0.34 (0.007) 0.33 0.29 0.38
European Trade Union Confederation 674 2210 0.34 (0.005) 0.34 0.31 0.37
Retailer Working Group 942 3965 0.34 (0.003) 0.35 0.33 0.36
Association of Communication Companies 363 1120 0.34 (0.006) 0.35 0.31 0.38
European Communities Trademark Association 356 1019 0.34 (0.006) 0.35 0.32 0.39
Joint Statements of Trade Mark Associations 366 976 0.35 (0.007) 0.37 0.33 0.41
Association of German Magazine Publishers 384 1218 0.36 (0.006) 0.40 0.37 0.43
Raw scores calculated using Wordscores module in Stata. CIs calculated based on MV transformation. Results presented from lowest to highest word scores.
MV, Martin-Vanberg.
Figure 2 Estimated changes in European Union Policy positions.
Word scores estimated in STATA, using tobacco industry and health
organisation documents as reference texts. Raw wordscores were
rescaled using the Martin-Vanberg transformation (see equation 2).
95% CIs depicted in black bars.
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methods to apply the MV transformation.24 This rescales
scores so that virgin documents can occupy the full range
from 0 to 1, which are the values occupied by the two sets of
reference documents, rather than bunching in the middle of
the scale.
Our results have implications for EU tobacco control policy.
While it may have expected a priori that DG-SANCO’s initial
document reﬂected a strong public health position, so that the
only direction of travel under industry pressure was towards the
tobacco industry’s position. Nonetheless, according to the
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, policy making
should be protected from industry, so evidence suggesting indus-
try inﬂuence on EU legislation is of concern.
Our ﬁndings of signiﬁcant textual shifts correspond to sub-
stantial policy changes to the TPD.10 At the Commission stage,
proposals for plain packaging and limitations on point of sale
displays were removed. At the Parliament and the Council stage
of the process, the size of pictorial health warnings was reduced
from 75% to 65% of carton size and the ban on slim cigarettes
was rejected. Additionally, the Parliament delayed for 5 years the
proposed ban on menthol-ﬂavoured cigarettes, which would
have been a major problem for the industry’s recruitment of
young smokers.
This study’s application of automated content analysis, to our
knowledge for the ﬁrst time to tobacco control, has important
implications for research and public policy. For researchers, the
use of automated content analysis methods to evaluate the asso-
ciation between pressure by lobby groups and public health
reforms increases the reliability of the analysis by removing the
subjectivity of human coding procedures. It is particularly rele-
vant to quantify the outcomes of pressure in this area due to
concerns that powerful industries are able to capture the agenda
of public health and effectively water down vital regulation.
Future applications of automated content analysis may be useful
for detecting potential industry front groups and mobilised
third-parties, as Wordscores can be used to identify relative posi-
tions of actors. Such an approach would also likely have import-
ant applications to analyses of the political economy of alcohol,
food and beverage industries, especially where there are large
numbers of actors whose policy positions and vested interests
may not be well understood.
What this paper adds
▸ The tobacco industry spends large sums lobbying the EU but
it is not known whether such lobbying signiﬁcantly affects
policy.
▸ This paper is the ﬁrst to apply quantitative text analysis to
evaluate the impact of tobacco industry pressure on EU
policymaking.
▸ The analysis demonstrates that industry pressure was
associated with a signiﬁcant shift in contested EU Tobacco
Products Directive towards the tobacco industry’s position.
▸ Several stakeholders' positions were found to be closer to
the tobacco industry than health NGOs, including retailers,
publishers and trade unions.
▸ The automated content analysis technique could be applied
to analyse the political economy of alcohol, food, and
beverage industries as well as to better identify tobacco-
industry front groups.
Correction notice This article has been corrected since it was published Online
First. The title has been updated from ‘Quantifying the inﬂuence of tobacco
industry…’ to ‘Quantifying the inﬂuence of the tobacco industry…’.
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